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TAKEOVERS AND THE 1983 MARYLAND
FAIR PRICE LEGISLATION
L. P. SCRIGGINS*
and DAVID CLARKE, JR.**
On June 21, 1983, the Maryland General Assembly enacted and
the Governor signed important legislation (the Act) providing fairness
prerequisites or special voting requirements for business combinations of
a Maryland corporation and certain persons that beneficially own ten
percent or more of the corporation's outstanding voting stock.' This leg-
islation was Maryland's response to two recent developments: the
Supreme Court's holding in Edgar v. MITE Corp.2 that the Illinois take-
over statute was unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate com-
merce, and the recent evolution of the takeover strategy known as the
front-loaded or two-tiered takeover. During the widely-publicized Ben-
dix-Martin Marietta takeover fight, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland had followed MITE and struck down the take-
over statute which the Maryland General Assembly had enacted in
1976. 3
In a front-loaded or two-tiered takeover, a corporation typically
makes a cash tender offer for a stated amount of the target's shares, such
as fifty-one percent, and gives notice that it intends to follow this acqui-
sition with a merger or similar transaction in which the remaining
shareholders will receive stock or debentures having a value substan-
* A.B., Middlebury College, 1958; J.D., University of Chicago, 1962. Mr. Scriggins is a
partner in the Baltimore law firm of Piper & Marbury.
** A.B., Harvard University, 1978; J.D., Harvard University, 1981. Mr. Clarke is an
associate with the Baltimore law firm of Piper & Marbury. The authors gratefully acknowl-
edge the assistance of their colleague, George P. Stamas, in the preparation of this article.
1. The Act was passed during a brief special session of the Maryland General Assembly.
Baltimore Sun, June 22, 1983, at AI, col. 2. The Maryland General Assembly had enacted
an earlier version of the Act, H.B. 1030, during its regular session. See 1983 Md. Laws 2466-
76. On May 31, 1983, the Governor had vetoed that bill, based on claims that certain exemp-
tions and exemptive procedures were unclear or inadequate, and had stated that he would
call a special session to consider a revised bill. 1983 Md. Laws 2464-66. The Act was
designed to meet the objections which led to the veto.
The Act amended § 3-202 and added §§ 3-601 to -603 of the Corporations and As-
sociations Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which are portions of the Maryland
General Corporation Law.
2. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
3. Se Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982) (striking
down §§ 11-901 to -908 of the Corporations and Associations Article of the Annotated Code
of Maryland).
MARYLAND FAIR PRICE LEGISLATION
tially less than the cash paid for the first fifty-one percent. The offeror
typically limits the opportunity to obtain the earlier, higher price to the
shortest period allowed by the rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC),' and the remaining shareholders are forced to
accept the lower price paid in the merger or similar transaction because
the state general corporation law typically allows the transaction to oc-
cur upon approval by a bare majority of the shareholders.' The front-
load or two-tiered takeover produces a stampeding effect which may
well enable the offeror to acquire the assets of the target corporation for
a combined price that is less than their real value.
After setting forth the historical background6 and summarizing the
provisions of the Act,7 this Article will demonstrate that under the
Supreme Court's analysis of the Illinois statute, which focused on the
negative effect of the state's tender offer regulation and the lack of any
substantial local interest justifying the regulation, the Act should with-
stand constitutional scrutiny.' The Act regulates only the new major-
ity's use of the statutory voting provisions to force out the minority at a
low price. Thus, the Act prevents acquiring stockholders from using the
voting provisions of a modern general corporation statute in a context
for which they were never intended. The Maryland legislature has ap-
plied old principles of conflict of interest and self dealing in a new con-
text and provided a traditional legislative response to a new problem.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A brief discussion of the historical changes that have occurred in
corporation laws and the techniques for combining corporations will set
the stage for consideration of the Act and its constitutional status. In
the early days of corporations in the United States, mergers and similar
transactions could not be accomplished without the consent of every
shareholder.9 Late in the nineteenth century, however, when the tradi-
4. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1983) (prohibiting tender offers held open for less than
twenty days after the offer is first published or sent or given to shareholders).
5. In many states, the general corporation law itself provides that such transactions may
occur upon approval by a bare majority of the shareholders. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT ANN. § 73 (1971, Supp. 1973 & Supp. 1977).. In Maryland, the general corporation law
provided that such transactions could occur upon approval by two thirds of the stockholders,
see MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-105(d) (1975), but allowed corporations to elect in
their articles of incorporation to be governed instead by the vote of a bare majority, see id. at
§ 2-104(b)(5).
6. See i nfra text accompanying notes 9-26.
7. See in~fa text accompanying notes 27-68.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 69-145.
9. See 13 R. EICKHOFF & M. MEIER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPO-
RATIONS § 5906.1, at 254 (1980 rev. ed.); Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers." 4 Historical
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tional rule proved to be an undesirable restriction on economic growth,
legislators enacted statutes allowing less than all of a corporation's
shareholders to authorize a merger or similar transaction if it had been
approved by the corporation's directors.' ° Many of these statutes now
provide that such transactions can be approved by a bare majority of
the shareholders." The statutes typically granted dissenting sharehold-
ers an appraisal right-the right to relinquish their stock in return for its
cash value.'2 Later, after World War II, the position of minority share-
holders was eroded further. Legislators enacted statutes allowing cash,
rather than stock in the new or surviving corporation, to be distributed
to the shareholders of the corporations involved in the transaction.'
3
The need for a vote of shareholders was eliminated altogether for merg-
ers and similar transactions involving a parent corporation and a
wholly-owned or almost wholly-owned subsidiary.' Many states elimi-
Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 627 (1981). The corporate charter was seen as a contract
among the shareholders, giving each shareholder vested rights, so that no fundamental corpo-
rate change could take place without his consent. See id.
10. See 13 R. EICKHOFF & M. MEIER, supra note 9, at 254; Weiss, supra note 9, at 629.
Maryland's first true general corporation statute, enacted in 1868, included such a provision.
See 1868 Md. Laws ch. 471, § 36. The current version of the provision is codified as § 3-
105(d) of the Corporations and Associations Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland.
11. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 73 (1971, Supp. 1973 & Supp. 1977). Mary-
land's first merger and consolidation provision, enacted in 1868, required approval by just a
bare majority of the stockholders. See 1868 Md. Laws ch. 471, § 36. During the extensive
overhaul of the Maryland general corporation statute which occurred in 1908, the merger
and consolidation provision was amended to require approval by two thirds of the stockhold-
ers. See 1908 Md. Laws ch. 240, § 29. That requirement still applies to negotiated transac-
tions. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-105(d) (Supp. 1983). The effect of the two-
thirds rule is somewhat mitigated by the fact that a Maryland corporation may elect in its
articles of incorporation to be governed instead by a bare majority. See id at § 2-104(b)(5)
(1975). See also supra note 5.
12. See 13 R. EICKHOFF & M. MEIER, supra note 9, at 254-55. The appraisal remedy was
added to the Maryland general corporation statute in 1908. See 1908 Md. Laws ch. 240, § 31.
The current version of the provision is codified as §§ 3-201 to -213 of the Corporations and
Associations Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland.
13. See Weiss, supra note 9, at 632-33, 648. Such authority was not directly granted to
Maryland corporations until 1975, when the Corporations and Associations Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland was enacted. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-103
(1975). Prior to 1975, such authority had been indirectly granted to Maryland corporations
in the provisions which specified what had to be included in the articles of consolidation or
merger. Se, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 68(6), 69(6) (1957). These provisions required
the articles of consolidation or merger to specify the amount of stock in the new or surviving
business entity or "other consideration" that was to be distributed to the stockholders of the
business entities involved in the consolidation or merger. See, e.g., id. The "other considera-
tion" language was first added in 1951. See 1951 Md. Laws ch. 1354, §§ 64(6), 65(6). Earlier
versions of these provisions implied that the stockholders of the business entities involved in
the consolidation or merger were required to receive stock in the new or surviving business
entity. See, e.g., 1949 Md. Laws ch. 452, §§ 33(2)(d), 34(2)(c).
14. See Weiss, supra note 9, at 648. Maryland first adopted such a "short form" merger
[VOL. 43:266
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nated appraisal right provisions, which had been accused of giving mi-
nority shareholders an excessive ability to hinder beneficial
transactions, 15 if the shares of the corporation were listed on a national
securities exchange.'
6
Those statutory changes greatly increased the ability of the major-
ity to effectuate a merger or similar transaction over the objections of
the minority and, if it so desired, to force the minority out of the new or
surviving corporation. But the changes had been enacted against a
background of mergers and similar transactions that were generally ne-
gotiated at arm's length by the directors of the two corporations.1
7
Since the 1960s, the statutory provisions have increasingly been used in
the wake of tender offers in which one of the corporations has gone over
the heads of the directors of the other corporation and dealt directly
with its shareholders. 8 In the first step, the corporation desiring to ac-
complish a merger or similar transaction uses a tender offer to obtain a
majority of the target corporation's stock. In the second step, a new
board of directors is installed and the statutory provisions are used to
bring about the desired transaction.
Viewed separately, the two steps of this process might seem unob-
provision in 1951, applicable only to wholly-owned subsidiaries. See 1951 Md. Laws ch. 135,
§ 63. In 1970, Maryland expanded its "short form" merger provision to cover subsidiaries in
which the parent owned ninety percent or more of the stock. See 1970 Md. Laws ch. 689, § 1.
The "short form" merger provision is currently codified as § 3-106 of the Corporations and
Associations Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland.
15. See Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Afecting Dissenters' Rights, 32 Bus. LAw.
1855, 1856-57 (1977).
16. See 13 R. EICKHOFF & M. MEIER, supra note 9, at 255. This limitation on the remedy
available to a dissenting shareholder was premised on the theory that the national securities
market provides a fair and efficient alternative to appraisal. See id. It is interesting to note
that, in 1978, the national securities exchange exemption was removed from the appraisal
right provisions contained in the Model Business Corporation Act on the ground that the
market does not, in fact, always provide fair value. See Conard, Amendments of Model Business
Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights (Sections 73, 71, 80 and 81), 33 Bus. LAW. 2587, 2595-
96 (1978). This judgment, which was made by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, stands
in sharp contrast to the single-minded devotion of certain writers to the "efficient market"
hypothesis. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Respond-
ing to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role].
Maryland adopted the national securites exchange exemption in 1970, see 1970 Md.
Laws ch. 689, § 1, and continues to apply it in the case of negotiated consolidations and
mergers, see MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-20 2 (c)(1) (Supp. 1983).
17. See Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case
Against Fiduci'a7y Duties, 1983 A.B.F. RES. J. 341, 347 n.31.
18. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL v
(1973); Brundney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L.
REV. 297, 330 (1974); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers.- A Proposalfor Legisla-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 257-59 (1983).
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jectionable. It could be argued that, in the first step, individual share-
holders are merely taking advantage of the free market for their shares
and that, in the second step, the new board of directors and the share-
holder majority required by the statutory provisions are merely exercis-
ing their well established right to bring about a fundamental corporate
change. Viewed together, however, the two steps surely amount to more
than this. First, at variance with the bulk of our historical experience, a
merger or similar transaction involving two previously independent cor-
porations has been accomplished without the approval of one of the
original boards of directors. Some commentators find this development
itself undesirable. t9 Second, because the usual statutory scheme does
not guarantee that the remaining shareholders will receive as much as
the majority received in the tender offer,20 its use in conjunction with a
tender offer may be expected to harm the shareholders as a group.2'
Specifically, because the usual statutory scheme does not guarantee that
the remaining shareholders will receive as much as the majority received
in the tender offer, the tender offer confronts shareholders with a "pris-
oner's dilemma" that can stampede them into accepting a tender offer
which represents less than the real value of the corporation's assets.22
19. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 257-68.
20. Where the stock of the target corporation is publicly traded and the target corpora-
tion is incorporated in a state which recognizes the national securities exchange exemption,
the problem is that the market price for a target corporation's shares generally falls below the
tender offer price as soon as the tender offeror executes its purchase. See Carney, supra note
17, at 351 n.47. This can result from many factors, including the tremendous decrease in
liquidity and investor concerns about the new parent's ability to manipulate the stock price.
If the national securities exchange exemption is not applicable, the problem is in the ap-
praisal mechanism itself. Most importantly, the typical appraisal right provision excludes
value flowing from the proposed merger or similar transaction. See Brudney & Chirelstein,
supra note 18, at 304-05; accord MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-202(b)(2) (Supp. 1983)
("fair value may not include any appreciation . . . which directly or indirectly results from
the transaction objected to or from its proposal"). In any event, typical appraisal right provi-
sions are loaded with procedural pitfalls for the unwary shareholder, and enforcement of one's
appraisal right is prohibitively expensive for most shareholders. See Eisenberg, The Legal Roles
of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decision Making, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85
(1969); Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Afecting Dissenters' Rights, supra note 15, at
1856; accord MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-203 (Supp. 1983). If the stock market and
the appraisal right statute have failed him, a shareholder can turn to common law fiduciary
principles for relief, but to date these have also failed to guarantee that the remaining share-
holders will receive as much as the majority received in the tender offer. See Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 18, at 309-13; Carney, supra note 17, at 363-64 (discussing the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983)); Weiss, supra note 9, at 661-80.
21. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 18, at 336-40; Carney, supra note 17, at
347-53.
22. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 21. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein, writing in
1974, appear to have been the first explicitly to identify this problem. See Carney, supra note
17, at 348-49. A front-loaded or two-tiered takeover creates several other problems as well. It
[VOL. 43:266
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This danger has become more serious in recent years as tender offerors
have recognized the coercion inherent in front-loaded or two-tiered
takeovers and have increasingly bid for a bare majority of the target's
stock rather than for "any and all."
Thus, during the last twenty years, the statutory scheme which de-
veloped over the course of a century or more has been put to use in a
new context, and the ramifications have been disturbing.23 The take-
over statute that the General Assembly passed in 1976 represented
is likely that the shareholders of the target corporation who fund the bulk of the transfer of
wealth will be the small individual shareholders. Theoretically, the shareholders of the target
corporation should suffer equally, because the offeror is required to purchase shares on a pro
rata basis from all shareholders who have tendered within at least twenty days of the an-
nouncement of the offer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976) (requiring a ten-day proration
period); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983) (rule adopted by the SEC in December 1982, requiring
that the proration pool be left open for the full life of the tender offer); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-
1(a) (1983) (requiring tender offers to remain open for at least twenty days). In practice,
however, it does not always work out that way. Professional and institutional investors who
have ready access to market information and the capability to tender securities rapidly have a
tremendous advantage over small individual stockholders, many of whom would not hear of
the proposal through the financial center news media. Many individual stockholders do not
receive any notice at all until the rather formidable formal documents come in the mail,
perhaps a week after the announcement of the tender offer. The size and complexity of these
documents is somewhat bewildering, and such a stockholder would have to act with great
alacrity in order to go to his safe deposit box, to get his stock certificates, and to send them to
a New York bank under cover of a complicated tender form with a signature guarantee in
time to meet the deadline. Worse yet, many of the individual stockholders may sell on the
market after seeing a dramatic rise in the price of their shares in newspaper quotations but
before receiving information enabling them to understand that an even higher price may be
available through the complex tender offer mechanics. It is also possible that an offeror who
values the target corporation's assets less than the target corporation does may nonetheless be
able to take advantage of the stampeding effect and acquire those assets for a combined price
that leaves it with a profit. See Carney, supra note 17, at 352 & n.48.
23. The changes which have taken place during the last twenty years have triggered an
outpouring of secondary literature which threatens to overwhelm the individual reader. See,
e.g., articles cited in Carney, supra note 17, at 344 nn.17 & 19, 346 n. 26; articles cited in
Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 250 n.5, 251 n.10. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have
emerged as the leading spokesmen for the position that contested takeovers are almost uni-
formly beneficial, that such takeovers have already been regulated more than enough, and
that the power of incumbent management to resist such takeovers should be sharply cur-
tailed. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982);
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 16; Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids,
Defensive Tactics and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAw. 1733 (1981); Fischel, Eftient Capital
Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (1978). Obviously, the authors of this article take a contrary view. See Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 18; Carney, supra note 17; Lowenstein, supra note 18.
Professors Brudney and Chirelstein deal with front-loaded or two-tiered takeovers in
the course of discussing the larger class of all parent-subsidiary mergers. They apparently
view the "prisoner's dilemma" as the most serious problem presented by front-loaded or two-
tiered takeovers over and above the problems presented by all parent-subsidiary mergers. See
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 18, at 337. Their proposed solution is "a rule which obli-
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Maryland's first response to this historical development. 24  The 1976
statute regulated the initial, tender offer stage of a takeover 25 and thus,
for reasons that will be discussed below, ran afoul of the Constitution.2 6
The new Act represents a more fundamental, and thus a more durable,
change in the statutory scheme governing Maryland corporations.
II. THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
The primary goal of the Act is to remedy the inequities resulting
from the front-loaded or two-tiered takeover. The Act provides that
when the second step of a takeover involves a forcing transaction using
state law voting provisions (i.e., when there is a merger or similar trans-
action with an interested stockholder), the second transaction is subject
gates [the offeror] to pay the same price per share on merger as it offered on tender." Id.
(emphasis in original).
Professor Carney agrees with Professors Brudney and Chirelstein that the "prisoner's
dilemma" needs to be corrected, but agrees with Professors Easterbrook and Fischel that more
regulation is not the solution. See Carney, supra note 17, at 342-44. Rather, he concludes that
the problem is one that the shareholders can solve for themselves in advance of any takeover
attempt by passing so-called "shark repellent" amendments to the corporation's charter and
bylaws. See id. at 343-44. He argues that market forces, operating along this avenue, are
more likely to reach the appropriate solution than is a legislature or administrative agency.
See id. However, there is reason to doubt the efficacy of adopting Professor Carney's proposal
and leaving the solution to market forces. While the shareholders of a significant number of
companies have adopted minority protection provisions similar to those found in the Act, it is
widely believed that many publicly owned companies have decided not to put forward such
amendments because of the expectation that institutional investors will not vote for them. See
Proxy Season Update. Voting on Fair-Pricing and Staggered-Board Amendments, Georgeson Report,
July 1983, at 3. Because the current federal scheme tends to favor professional investors who
are close to the market, as opposed to small individual shareholders, see supra note 22, a corpo-
ration whose shareholder population is heavily weighted toward institutional investors may
expect an unfavorable vote on such provisions. The Act represents a judgment by the Mary-
land General Assembly that small stockholders should obtain the protections afforded by such
provisions.
Professor Lowenstein is more concerned with a perceived inconsistency between take-
overs and the fundamental nature of corporations than he is with the problem of the "pris-
oner's dilemma." See Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 257-68. As a solution, Professor
Lowenstein proposes amendments to the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-()
(1976), the federal statute regulating tender offers. See Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 317-34.
Among other things, Professor Lowenstein believes that the minimum life for a tender offer
should be increased to six months. See id. The authors of this article believe that, although
that proposal has merit, it is politically unrealistic and may go too far.
24. See MD. CORPS. & ASSN'S CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1983).
25. Among other things, the 1976 statute required a tender offeror to file a disclosure
statement at least twenty days before the commencement of the offer and allowed the Mary-
land Securities Commissioner to suspend a tender offer indefinitely while conducting an in-
vestigation or hearing relating to its fairness. For a summary of the 1976 statute, see Bendix
Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 523-24 (D. Md. 1982) (declaring the 1976
statute unconstitutional).
26. See infia text accompanying notes 69-145.
272
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to a higher vote than is usually required unless the price paid in the
second transaction is as high as the price paid in the first step of the
takeover bid. The Act also requires the higher vote for certain other
transactions with interested stockholders. The Act applies only to trans-
actions that state law has traditionally required to be approved by stock-
holder vote and transactions that involve a conflict of interest. It does
not apply to tender or other offers to buy stock in which the stockholder
has the freedom to make his own decision to sell or not to sell-that is, in
which the shareholder will not be bound by a majority vote.2 7
The Act defines a "business combination" to include various trans-
actions.28 A business combination with a person who meets the Act's
definition of an "interested stockholder" (i.e., a stockholder controlling
at least ten percent of the corporation's stock2 9 ) must be recommended
by the board of directors and approved by eighty percent of the total
votes entitled to be cast on the matter and two-thirds of the votes entitled
to be cast by holders of voting stock other than voting stock held by the
interested stockholder or an affiliate thereof.3 ° A corporation that al-
ready has a charter provision that requires a lesser proportion of votes
than otherwise required by the statute (as is now permitted") is never-
theless subject to the Act.32 The voting requirements are suspended if
27. In this respect, the Maryland Act is strikingly different from the takeover statute
passed by Ohio in the wake of MITE. In the fall of 1983, the Ohio legislature amended the
Ohio general corporation law to subject certain acquisitions of stock to shareholder approal.
Specifically, whenever a purchaser moves into one of several ownership ranges (one fifth to
one third, one third to one half, or over one halo, the transaction must be approved by a
majority of all shareholders and a majority of all shareholders other than the acquiring person.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(E)(1) (Page Supp. 1983). The statute applies to all Ohio
corporations having at least fifty shareholders and a principal place of business, principal
executive offices or substantial assets in Ohio. Id. at § 1701.01(Y) (Page Supp. 1983). For a
general discussion of this statute, concluding that it is probably unconstitutional, see Kreider,
Fortress Without Foundation? Ohi'o Takeover Act II, 52 CINN. L. REV. 108 (1983).
Pennsylvania has taken an interesting intermediate approach. In December 1983, the
Pennsylvania legislature amended the Pennsylvania general corporation law so that certain
acquisitions of stock trigger an enhanced appraisal right. Specifically, whenever a purchaser
obtains at least thirty percent of a corporation's stock, the remaining shareholders may de-
mand the fair value of their stock in cash. PA. Bus. CORP. L. § 910D (1983). Fair value is to
be computed as of the date when the purchaser acquired a thirty percent interest, and is
required to reflect the increment which the purchaser paid for control. Id. § 910E.
In addition to Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, at least three states--Michigan,
Kentucky and Wisconsin-are considering or have enacted takeover statutes designed to
withstand invalidation under the MITE analysis. This article will not consider how any ap-
proaches other than Maryland's can be expected to fare in the courts.
28. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601(e) (Supp. 1983)
29. Id. at § 3-601(j).
30. Id. at § 3-602.
31. Id at § 2-104(b)(5) (1975).
32. Id at § 3-603(o (Supp. 1983).
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an exemption is available33 or if certain fairness prerequisites are
satisfied.34
The Act exempts investment companies registered under the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, close corporations (organized under
special statutory provisions), corporations having fewer than 100 stock-
holders, and corporations that elect to be exempt in their original arti-
cles of incorporation. 35  Any exempted corporation may elect to be
covered by the statute by the vote normally required to amend its arti-
cles of incorporation.3 6 Any corporation whose stockholders adopt a
charter amendment after June 30, 1983, by the same vote required for
business combinations (i.e., eighty percent and two thirds) may elect to
be exempt.3 7
A Maryland corporation that on July 1, 1983, had an existing inter-
ested stockholder is entirely exempt from the statute unless, by a resolu-
tion of its board of directors, it elects to become subject to the statute.38
That election may be in whole or in part, for a particular transaction or
type of transaction, or with respect to an identified interested stock-
holder. 39 A corporation subject to this provision must inform the State
Department of Assessments and Taxation of Maryland if it elects to be
subject to the statute without qualification.4 ° If no election is made, or
if the election is partial, no state filing is required.4" Until September 1,
1983, a Maryland corporation that did not have an interested stock-
holder on July 1, 1983, could have elected, by a resolution of its board of
directors, to be exempt in whole or in part, or in a flexible manner with
respect to particular types of business combinations or other classes of
transactions or persons.4 2 This election would be revocable unless the
terms of the resolution provided that it was irrevocable.
43
The Act also exempts any transaction that is negotiated prior to the
33. Id. at § 3-603 (e).
34. Id. at § 3-603 (b).
35. Id. at § 3-603(e)(1).
36. Id. at § 3-603(e)(1).
37. Id. at § 3-603(e)(l)(iii).
38. Id. at § 3-603(d)(1).
39. Id.
40. Id. at § 3-603(d)(4).
41. See id.
42. Id. at § 3-603(c)(1)(i).
43. Id. at § 3-603(c)(2). In addition, the board of directors of a corporation that had no
interested stockholder on July 1, 1983, could have irrevocably accelerated the September 1,
1983, deadline for taking exemptive action. Id. at § 3-603(c)(1)(i). Thus, for example, if a
front-loaded or two-tiered tender had been mounted for a Maryland corporation on July 1,
1983, with the prospect of a change in control and a change in the board of directors on
August 15, 1983, the current board of directors could have taken irrevocable action to acceler-
ate the deadline for taking exemptive action to August 1, 1983.
[VOL. 43:266
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interested stockholder's acquisition of ten percent of the corporation's
stock. Specifically, the higher voting requirements and fair price provi-
sions of the Act do not apply to a transaction with a particular inter-
ested stockholder or its affiliates if the transaction is approved by the
board of directors of the corporation prior to the date when the inter-
ested stockholder becomes an interested stockholder.4 4 Thus, the law
does not affect friendly transactions if worked out prior to the date when
the acquiring company owns as much as ten percent of the stock of the
Maryland corporation.
As indicated above, a key definition in the Act is the definition of
"business combination."4 5 The term is defined to include five different
types of transactions. Any merger, consolidation or share exchange of a
Maryland corporation with any interested stockholder or any corpora-
tion which is, or after the transaction would be, an affiliate of a person
or entity that was an interested stockholder before the transaction is a
business combination.4 6 This aspect of the definition includes the sec-
ond step in the typical front-loaded or two-tiered tender offer. If the
merger, consolidation, or share exchange does not alter the contract
rights of the stock or convert any outstanding shares of stock of the cor-
poration, then it is not considered to be a business combination.4 7
The definition of "business combination" also includes any sale,
lease, or other disposition of a corporation's assets having an aggregate
book value of ten percent or more of the total market value of the out-
standing stock of the corporation or of its net worth measured as of the
end of its most recently ended fiscal quarter.4 8 This aspect of the defini-
tion prohibits an acquiring corporation from forcing the target corpora-
tion to dispose of its assets without complying with the statute, and thus
prevents the majority from squeezing out the minority in a roundabout
fashion. Coverage is limited to transactions that are out of the ordinary
course of business and to transactions with an interested stockholder or
an interested stockholder's affiliate.49 Furthermore, any series of trans-
actions which occurs within a twelve month period is to be aggregated
for the purpose of determining whether the ten percent threshold has
been satisfied. 50
A third aspect of the definition of "business combination" prevents
44. Id. at § 3-603(c)(1)(ii).
45. Id. at § 3-601(e).
46. Id. at § 3-601(e)(1).
47. Id.





those in control of a target corporation from issuing or transfering five
percent or more of the corporation's equity to any interested stockholder
or his affiliate.5 1 This aspect of the definition is also designed to pre-
clude an acquiring corporation from squeezing out minority sharehold-
ers. Without this prohibition, the acquiring group, after gaining
control, might try to sell authorized but unissued stock or treasury stock
to itself or a potential ally until it could satisfy at least the first of the
supermajority voting requirements-the eighty percent requirement.
Once again, any series of transactions is to be aggregated for the purpose
of determining whether the threshold has been satisfied.5 2 In this in-
stance, however, the aggregation is not limited to a twelve-month
period. 5
3
The definition of "business combination" also includes the liquida-
tion or dissolution of a corporation if an interested shareholder or his
affiliate is to receive anything other than cash.54 Finally, the Act defines
"business combination" to include certain securities transactions (reclas-
sifications, recapitalizations and mergers, consolidations or share ex-
changes with subsidiaries) which increase the percentage of the
corporation controlled by an interested shareholder or its affiliate.55
The Act defines "interested stockholder" to be any person that (i)
beneficially owns ten percent or more of the outstanding voting stock of
the corporation, or (ii) is an affiliate of the corporation and at any time
during the preceding two years beneficially owned ten percent or more
of the outstanding voting stock of the corporation. 56 Beneficial owner-
ship is broadly defined along the lines of similar rules of the SEC and
includes ownership by affiliates, associates, and certain relatives and
ownership through arrangements giving a person the right to acquire or
the right to vote stock. 57
In addition to the general exemptions outlined above, the Act ex-
empts mergers, consolidations, and share exchanges that would other-
wise be considered business combinations if certain fairness
requirements are met.5" These requirements are designed to protect mi-
51. Id. at § 3-601 (e) (3).
52. Id.
53. The twelve-month limitation in § 3-601(e)(2) was added to the statute after the Gov-
ernor's veto of H.B. 1030. See 1983 Md. Laws 2469 (§ 3-601(e)(2) as it appeared in H.B.
1030).
54. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601(e)(4) (Supp. 1983).
55. Id. at § 3-601 (e) (5).
56. Id. at § 3-6010).
57. Id. at § 3-601(d); see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1983).
58. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-603(b)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1983).
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nority shareholders by guaranteeing that they will receive the same con-
sideration for their stock in the second step of the two-tiered takeover
that the majority received in the tender offer. Some of the fairness pre-
requisites relate to price, and others relate to non-price aspects of the
transaction.
The nature of the price conditions depends upon the type of stock
involved in the transaction. 9 The amount of cash and the value of
other consideration to be received by holders of common stock must be
at least equal to the highest price resulting from the application of three
tests which relate to the price paid by the interested stockholder and the
market value of the stock. Specifically, the amount of consideration to
be received by holders of common stock must be at least equal to the
highest value determined by any of the following three methods: (a) the
highest price per share paid by the interested stockholder for any share
of the corporation's common stock during the two years prior to the first
public announcement of the proposed business combination (the "an-
nouncement date") or in the transaction in which it became an inter-
ested stockholder (the date of such transaction is the "determination
date"), whichever is higher; (b) the market value per share of common
stock on the announcement date or on the determination date, which-
ever is higher; and (c) a price equal to the value per share determined
under (b) multiplied by the ratio of (i) the highest price per share paid
by the interested stockholder for any share of common stock during the
two-year period prior to the announcement date, and (ii) the market
value per share of the common stock on the first date during the two-
year period that the interested stockholder acquired any shares of com-
mon stock.' An illustration of the foregoing is as follows:
(i) highest price paid during the two-year period prior to
the announcement date ($22.00) or in the transaction on the
determination date ($21.00), whichever is higher: $22.00
(ii) the market value on the announcement date ($24.00)
or on the determination date ($21.00), whichever is higher:
$2.00
(iii) higher value in (ii) multiplied by the ratio of the
highest price paid during the two-year period prior to the an-
nouncement date and the first price paid during such period
($24.00 x $22.00/$20.00): $26.40
The interested stockholder would be required to pay at least $26.40 per
share to holders of common stock in the business combination if he
59. Id. at § 3-603(b)(1), (2).
60. Id. at § 3-603(b)(1).
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purchased any stock during the two years prior to the transaction in
which he became an interested stockholder. If the interested stockholder
did not purchase any shares of common stock during the two years prior
to becoming an interested stockholder, the minimum price under the
statute would be the price paid in the transaction on the determination
date, the market value on the announcement date, or the market value
on the determination date, whichever is higher, or, in the example
above, $24 per share.
The amount of cash and the value of other consideration to be re-
ceived by holders of any class or series of stock other than common stock
must be equal to the highest price resulting from the application of four
tests which are based on the market value of the stock, the price paid for
any of the stock by the interested stockholder, and the price stockholders
would be paid for the stock in the event of liquidation, dissolution, or
winding up of the corporation. Specifically, the amount of considera-
tion to be received by holders of stock other than common stock must be
at least equal to the higher of (i) the highest per share price determined
with respect to such class of stock in the same manner as described
above for common stock, or (ii) the highest preferential amount per
share to which the holders of such class of stock would be entitled in the
event of a voluntary or involuntary liquidation, dissolution, or winding
up of the corporation.6 Finally, the consideration to be received by
holders of any class of outstanding stock must be in cash or in the same
form as the interested stockholder paid for the largest number of the
shares of stock of the same class that he acquired.6 2
The basic non-price conditions are as follows (with certain excep-
tions relating to acts not controlled by or acquiesced in by the interested
stockholder): between the time of acquisition of stock by the interested
stockholder and consummation of the business combination, (a) divi-
dends on any preferred stock must have been declared and paid on the
regular dates; (b) there shall not have been a reduction in the annual
rate of dividends paid on any class of stock that is not preferred stock,
and there must have been an increase in the annual rate of dividends if
necessary to reflect any reclassification, recapitalization or reorganiza-
tion; (c) the interested stockholder shall not have acquired any addi-
tional shares of stock except by virtue of pro rata stock splits or stock
dividends; and (d) the interested stockholder shall not have received the
benefit of any loans, advances, guarantees, pledges, or other financial
61. Id. at § 3-603(b)(2).
62. Id. at § 3-603(b)(3).
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assistance, or any tax credits or other tax advantages provided by the
corporation or one of its subsidiaries.6 3
The Act also amended the appraisal right provisions of the existing
law. A stockholder of a corporation who objects to a "business combina-
tion," as defined in the Act, may demand cash payment of the fair value
of his stock through an appraisal proceeding.' The Act eliminates the
national securities exchange exemption for business combinations.
6 5
The appraisal remedy is available even if the transaction is exempt from
the supermajority voting requirements under the fairness prerequisites
of the Act.66 If the business combination is exempted by any other stat-
utory provision, then the appraisal remedy is not available.6 7 Whenever
the appraisal remedy is available, fair value will be determined pursu-
ant to the same price standards that are used to determine whether a
business combination is exempt from the higher voting requirements im-
posed by the Act.68
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MARYLAND ACT
The recent experience of state takeover statutes in the courts inevi-
tably raises the question of the constitutionality of the Act. A wave of
lower court decisions, set in motion in 1977 by Great Western United Corp.
v. Kidwell6 9 and given full impetus by the Supreme Court's decision in
Edgar v. MITE Corp. , eventually washed away virtually all of the
thirty-seven state takeover statutes which had been enacted between
63. Id. at § 3-603(b) (4), (5).
64. Id. at § 3-202(a)(5).
65. Id. at § 3-202(c).
66. Id. at § 3-202(a)(5). Thus, in the rare situation where the initial tender offer is for
securities rather than for cash, so that the Act's fairness requirements can be satisfied without
paying the minority stockholders cash, the appraisal remedy will be available for the tradi-
tional purpose of letting minority stockholders cash in their investment.
67. The statute states that the stockholder may demand fair value if the "[t]ransaction is
governed by § 3-602 of this title or exempted by 3-603(b) of this title." Id. at § 3-202(a) (5).
By negative implication, the appraisal remedy is not available when the transaction is ex-
empted under any provision other than § 3-603(b).
68. Id. at § 3-202(b)(3).
69. 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977),affd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978),rev'don grounds
of improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1973). The Supreme
Court's refusal to reach the merits in 'idwell started a trend, which lasted until MITE was
decided, in which lower courts struggled to avoid the merits if they could. See cases cited in
Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 692 n.17 (1981).
70. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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1968 and late 1981. 71 Maryland's 1976 takeover statute, 72 which nar-
rowly avoided being one of the first casualities in Kidwel, 73 was struck
down a few months after MITE during the much-publicized Bendix-
Martin Marietta takeover fight.74
A. Edgar v. MITE Corp.
The state takeover statutes that were enacted between 1968 and
1981 were identical in several crucial respects. 75 The statutes regulated
the initial, tender offer stage of a takeover.7 6 They imposed procedural
requirements, substantive requirements, or both directly on the tender
offeror.7 7 As a practical matter, a state cannot effectively regulate
tender offers for large corporations by regulating only offers made to its
own residents.7" Therefore, all of the state takeover statutes that were
enacted between 1968 and 1981 imposed requirements on tender offers
even to the extent that the offer involved communications between out-
of-state offerors and out-of-state offerees.79
In MITE, the Supreme Court addressed two distinct constitutional
challenges to the Illinois takeover statute: 80 the tender offeror argued
71. The case law as it stood shortly before the Supreme Court's decision in MITE is
summarized in some detail in Sargent, supra note 69, at 692-702. Some of the more important
of the post-MITE decisions are Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Servs. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th
Cir. 1983), Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983), Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982), National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122
(8th Cir. 1982), and Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982).
Citations to the thirty-seven state takeover statutes which were on the books in late 1981 are
provided in Sargent, supra note 69, at 690 n.7. All but one of these statutes was passed after
Congress' 1968 adoption of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) & 78n(d)-(f) (1976), the
federal statute regulating tender offers. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 631 n.6. Virginia's statute
predated the Williams Act by less than five months. See id.
72. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1982).
73. See 439 F. Supp. at 428 (holding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that it
had "a concrete case or controversy against the Maryland statute").
74. See Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982).
75. For a discussion of the common characteristics of state takeover statutes see Wilner &
Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionaity, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
1, 5-9 (1976).
76. Indeed, until very recently, it simply went without saying that takeover regulation
involved tender offer regulation. For several examples of discussions that assume that take-
over regulation means tender offer regulation, see Sargent, supra note 64; The Supreme Court-
1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 62-71 (1982) (comment on the MITE case); Note, Securities
Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510 (1979).
77. The specific provisions of the state takeover statutes enacted between 1968 and 1981
are discussed in some detail in Sargent, supra note 69,passim; Note, supra note 76, at 514-16.
78. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 18, at 157; Note, supra note 76, at 515 &
n.34.
79. See Sargent, supra note 69, at 690 n.7; The Supreme Court-1981 Term, supra note 76, at
65 n.29; Note, supra note 76, at 515.
80. See 457 U.S. at 626.
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that the statute violated both the supremacy clause"' and the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution. 2 The tender offeror argued
that the state statute was unconstitutional under the supremacy clause
because it conflicted with the federal statute regulating tender offers, the
Williams Act." Finding that the Williams Act does not explicitly pre-
empt the field of tender offer regulation,8 4 the Court noted that state
legislation is nonetheless invalid under the supremacy clause if it is im-
possible to comply with both the state and the federal requirements or if
the state legislation "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."85
On the facts before the Court, 6 it was not impossible to comply
81. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
...shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ").
82. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. ("The Congress shall have Power .. .[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... ").
83. See 457 U.S. at 630-40. The Williams Act is codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(O. The Williams Act was passed in 1968, when the tender offer phenomena was
relatively new and still appeared fragile. See Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 252. If the Wil-
liams Act did indeed represent a final judgment as to the appropriate level of regulation, see
tnfta text accompanying note 89, it stands in sharp contrast with the much more restrictive
approach previously taken in England, see COUNCIL FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY, THE
CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS (5th ed. 1981), where the tender offer phenom-
ena had appeared years earlier, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 18, at v. The first
fifteen years of experience with the Williams Act apparently has convinced the agency re-
sponsible for its enforcement that some significant changes are necessary. In a report pub-
lished on July 8, 1983, the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers proposed a series of
changes which would sharply depart from current practice and, despite statements to the
contrary, interject federal regulation into certain corporate transactions traditionally gov-
erned by state law. On March 13, 1984, the SEC endorsed many of the proposed changes,
but disapproved of those which it deemed most intrusive into the traditional area of state
regulation. Wall St. J., March 14, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
84. See 457 U.S. at 631. There is no indication in the legislative history of the Williams
Act that Congress was aware of state takeover statutes. Id. at 631 n.6. The Williams Act
constituted an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1983), which already contained the following provision:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or
any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or
any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the
rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a). It has been argued that this provision creates a presumption against
preemption which extends even to the Williams Act. See Sargent, supra note 69, at 704-06
(discussing both sides of the debate).
85. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), quoted in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978), and MITE, 457 U.S. at 631.
86. The tender offer at issue in MITE was made in February 1979 and abandoned in
March 1979. The tender offeror obtained a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of
the Illinois statute and did not comply with the statute. The only reason why a majority of
the Supreme Court concluded that the case was not moot was because Illinois' Secretary of
State had indicated that he would bring an action for civil penalties against the tender offeror
if the statute were upheld. See 457 U.S. at 630. Thus, even though MITE was decided in
June 1982, the Supreme Court was limited to considering the statute's validity as of February
and March 1979.
Meanwhile, on January 7, 1980, shortly after the set of facts in MITE had crystalized,
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with both the state and federal requirements.87 As for the final prong of
the test, of the six Justices who reached the merits in MITE, three Jus-
tices concluded that the state legislation was invalid, two concluded that
it was not invalid, and one refused to say.88 The three Justices who
concluded that the state legislation was invalid argued that Congress
sought to "strike a balance between the investor, management, and the
takeover bidder" in the Williams Act, and that any state regulation
which altered the balance frustrated the objectives of the Act.8 9 These
Justices found that the Illinois statute altered the balance struck by
Congress not only because it provided stockholders with additional time
to decide and additional information,' but also because it allowed the
Secretary of State to veto tender offers that he considered unfair.9
These Justices concluded that the veto was inconsistent with what they
deemed to be a basic feature of the Williams Act-full stockholder free-
the first prong of the supremacy clause analysis-impossibility of simultaneous compliance-
was brought into play by the SEC. See Sargent, supra note 69, at 695-97; The Supreme Court-
1981 Term, supra note 76, at 67-68. Acting pursuant to the rule-making authority conferred
on it by the Williams Act, the SEC promulgated new rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)
(1983), for the express purpose of making it impossible for a tender offeror to comply with
both the Williams Act and the major features of the state takeover statutes then in effect. See
SEC Release No. 34-16,384, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326 (1979), reprinted in [1979-80] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,373. Most importantly, the new rule required a tender offeror to commence
its tender offer within five days of announcing the material terms of the offer, and defined the
announcement that triggered the five-day requirement so that it included the filings that
many states required a tender offeror to make anywhere between twenty and sixty days
before the commencement of a tender offer. The new rule also made it impossible to comply
with both the Williams Act and the state statutes to the extent that they provided pro rata,
withdrawal or certain other rights different from those provided by the Williams Act. See The
Supreme Court-1981 Term, supra note 76, at 68 n.40. As was soon borne out by a series of
lower court decisions, see, e.g., cases cited in Sargent, supra note 69, at 697 nn.47-48, the SEC's
action virtually guaranteed a finding of preemption. But cf. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Con-
nolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (provision of Massachusetts Act, which barred corpora-
tions from making a tender offer for twelve months as a sanction for failures to make
disclosure, was not preempted; plaintiff conceded the validity of the disclosure requirement
and challenged only the sanction).
87. See 457 U.S. at 631-32.
88. See id. at 632-40 (opinion of White, J., in which Burger, C.J. and Blackmun, J.,
joined) (statute invalid); id. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring in part) (statute valid); id. at 655
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (same); id. at 655 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part) (not necessary to reach preemption issue). The Supreme Court's 3-2 vote
on this issue left the lower courts free to do as they see fit. See The Supreme Court-1981 Term,
supra note 76, at 63 n. 15.
89. See 457 U.S. at 634-39.
90. See id. In so doing, these Justices adopted the view that the benefits of allowing stock-
holders additional time to decide were outweighed by the additional opportunity afforded to
incumbent management to fend off the tender offer through the use of improper defensive
tactics. See id. at 635. This view later played an important role in the majority's commerce
clause analysis. See infra notes 108 & 116 and accompanying text.
91. See 457 U.S. at 639-40.
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dom to accept or reject the offer.92 The two Justices who concluded that
the state legislation was not invalid accepted their opponents' reading of
the Williams Act's legislative history, but stated that they were "not per-
suaded. . . that Congress' decision to follow a policy of neutrality in its
own legislation is tantamount to a federal prohibition against state legis-
lation designed to provide special protection for incumbent
management.
9 3
The tender offeror argued that the state takeover statute was un-
constitutional under the commerce clause because it impermissibly in-
terfered with interstate commerce.94 There are two parts to the
commerce clause test, or at least there were two parts to the test articu-
lated by Justice White in the lead opinion in MITE.95 According to
Justice White, state legislation is invalid if it regulates interstate com-
merce directly, as opposed to indirectly, or if the burden of an indirect
regulation on interstate commerce outweighs the legitimate local bene-
fits.96 Justice White concluded that the Illinois takeover statute was in-
valid under both prongs of this test.9 Three other Justices agreed with
him on the first prong of the test.9 8 Four other Justices agreed with him
on the second prong of the test, making this balancing test the only basis
for striking down the Illinois statute that was endorsed by a majority of
the Court.9 9
Arguably, the first half of Justice White's test, founded on a distinc-
tion between direct and indirect regulation, was jettisoned by the Court
92. See id.
93. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); accord id. at
646-47 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
94. See id. at 640-46.
95. As for the possibility that Justice White departed from the prevailing standard, see
infra note 100 and accompanying text.
96. See 457 U.S. at 640.
97. See id. at 641-46.
98. In addition to Chief Justice Burger, who joined in Justice White's entire opinion,
Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined in this portion of Justice White's opinion. See id. at
654-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 655 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part).
99. In addition to Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor joined in
this portion of Justice White's opinion. See id. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at
654-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgement); id. at 655 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part). It is worth noting that Justice Powell joined this portion of Justice
White's opinion even though he was one of the three Justices who had concluded that the case
was moot. See id. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Among the six Justices who con-
cluded that the case was justiciable, no more than four could agree on any one ground for
striking down the Illinois Act. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing 3-2-1 split
on preemption issue). For a criticism of the Supreme Court's increasing inability to reach a




during the judicial revolution of the 1930s and had not since reap-
peared."° Regardless of the usefulness of the distinction as a general
matter, Justice White's actual application of the first part of his test was
perplexing because it seems inconsistent with the Court's prior treat-
ment of state blue sky legislation. Justice White himself pointed out
that "this Court has upheld the authority of States to enact 'blue sky'
laws against Commerce Clause challenges on several occasions."'' Al-
though all of the cases which he cited were decided in 1917,102 the Jus-
tice did not indicate that there was any reason to question the
applicability of their holdings to today's blue sky laws. However, Justice
White distinguished state blue sky laws from the state takeover statute
at issue in MITE on the ground that blue sky laws deal solely with intra-
state transactions. 0 3 That argument may distinguish the blue sky laws
at issue in the 1917 decisions which he had cited, but it cannot distin-
guish the blue sky laws on the books today. Generally modeled on the
Uniform Securities Act, modern blue sky laws regulate offers made by
telephone or mail from another state to someone in the regulating
state--quintessential interstate commerce.1'4 State blue sky laws can be
distinguished from the Illinois statute on a ground not mentioned by
White-at least one end of the transaction regulated by the blue sky
laws occurs in the regulating state.'0 5 Thus, Justice White's brief discus-
sion of blue sky laws would not merit attention were it not for the fact
that he indicated that Illinois' takeover statute would have been invalid
100. See Supreme Court-1981 Term, supra note 76, at 64 n. 16 (citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-5, at 326 (1978)).
101. 457 U.S. at 641.
102. See id. (citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), Caldwell v. Sioux Falls
Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917), and Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568
(1917)).
103. See 457 U.S. at 641.
104. See UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 414. This is not to say that the courts of the regulat-
ing state have personal jurisdiction over the offeror. Indeed, the draftor of the Uniform Se-
curities Act has explicitly recognized that the Act will prohibit conduct by many offerors over
whom the regulating state cannot obtain personal jurisdiction. Lecture by Louis A. Loss,
September 9, 1980. Thus, Justice White's comment that the "limits on a state's power to
enact substantive legislation are similar to the limits on the jurisdiction of state courts," 457
U.S. at 643, is extremely perplexing if one assumes that modern blue sky laws are constitu-
tionally valid.
105. In contrast, in its takeover statute Illinois purported to regulate even that portion of a
tender offer which involved communications made, for example, from New York to Florida.
Consistent with its past decisions, the Court might have struck down the Illinois statute-or
any of the takeover statutes enacted between 1968 and 1981-solely because of this extraterri-
torial effect. Compare Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (it is constitutional for New
York to regulate the price paid to New York farmers for milk), with Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (it is not constitutional for New York to regulate the price paid by a
buyer in Vermont for milk even if he is going to transport it to New York and sell it in New
York).
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as a "direct" regulation of interstate commerce even if it regulated noth-
ing other than offers communicated from out-of-state to Illinois resi-
dents."6 Taken at face value, Justice White's argument implies that all
modern blue sky laws are unconstitutional.'0 7
As for the second part of his commerce clause test, Justice White
described the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by the Illinois
takeover statute as follows:
Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their
shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic resources
to their highest valued use, a process which can improve effi-
ciency and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender
offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform
well so that stock prices remain high is reduced. 0 8
On the other side of the equation, Illinois suggested that its statute pro-
tected resident stockholders and regulated the internal affairs of corpo-
rations incorporated in Illinois. "9
The Court held that the legitimate local benefits served by the Illi-
nois takeover statute did not outweigh the burdens that it imposed on
interstate commerce. 1 To begin with, the Court noted that much of
Illinois' regulatory scheme did not further Illinois' claimed goals at all,
because the statute regulated tender offers that involved communica-
tions to nonresident stockholders,"' and tender offers for corporations
which had a "presence" in Illinois but which were not incorporated
there." 2 The Court stated flatly that "the State has no legitimate inter-
est in protecting nonresident shareholders" ' and that "Illinois has no
interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations." 4
The Court also pointed out that the state's purported concern for stock-
holders was belied by the fact that its statute did not apply to a corpora-
106. See 457 U.S. at 641-42.
107. In all fairness, despite the unfortunate indications to the contrary, there is language in
Justice White's opinion which suggests that the argument given here for distinguishing state
blue sky laws is what he actually had in mind. See, e.g., id. at 641 ("The Illinois Act differs
substantially from state blue-sky laws in that it directly regulates transactions which take
place across state lines, even if wholly outside the State of Illinois") (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 643-44 (citing Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 16, at 1173-74;
Fischel, supra note 23, at 5, 27-28, 45; H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976)
(legislative history of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976)).
109. See 457 U.S. at 644.
110. See id. at 644-46.
111. See id. at 644.
112. See id. at 645-46.
113. Id. at 644.
114. Id. at 645-46.
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tion's offer to buy its own stock. 15 In the Court's view, the net benefits
conferred on stockholders by the Illinois statute were insubstantial and
speculative.' 16 Finally, as for the state's interest in regulating the inter-
nal affairs of a corporation incorporated under its laws, the Court de-
nied that the regulation of tender offers constituted any such thing:
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle
which recognizes that only one State should have the authority
to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-matterspeculiar to the
relationships among or between the corporation and its current ofjcers,
directors, and shareholders-because otherwise a corporation
could be faced with conflicting demands. That doctrine is of
little use to the State in this context. Tender offers contemplate
transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and do not themselves
implicate the internal affairs of the target company. 7
This passage provides the key to understanding why the Maryland Act
is constitutional. The Act does not regulate the initial, tender offer stage
of a takeover at all. Rather, it regulates the second, forced transaction
stage of a takeover and directly concerns the target corporation's "inter-
nal affairs."
B. Theory of the Act
As was pointed out earlier, some commentators argue that take-
overs are undesirable because the tender offer allows shareholders-
rather than the directors-to decide whether the corporation should
enter into a merger or similar transaction and because that power is
inconsistent with the fundamental attributes of a corporation."" In en-
acting the Williams Act, Congress did nothing to solve this purported
problem.' Rather, Congress left stockholders with full freedom to ac-
115. See id. at 644.
116. See id. at 644-45. The Court apparently endorsed the view that the benefit gained by
giving stockholders more time to consider a tender offer is outweighed by the danger that
incumbent management will defeat a desirable tender offer through the use of improper de-
fensive tactics. This is very much the view of the authorities which the Court had cited earlier
when describing the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by the Illinois Act. See generally
sources cited supra note 108. The Court also apparently endorsed the view that the additional
disclosure required by the states, over and above what the Williams Act required, might well
confuse stockholders rather than enlighten them.
117. 457 U.S. at 645 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 257-68.
119. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968) (House Report on the
Williams Act); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) (Senate Report on the Williams
Act); Hearings on H R. 14475, S 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4, 47-48 (1968) (House hearings on the Williams Act); Hearings on S. 510 Before the Sub-
comm. on Banking and Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 19, 25, 182 (1967) (Senate Hearings on
the Williams Act).
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cept or reject a tender offer.1 2 ° Many of the courts that struck down
state takeover statutes on preemption grounds concluded that Congress'
failure to restrict stockholder freedom represented a positive judgment
that this freedom should not be restricted.' 2 ' Those federal court deci-
sions cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of further attempts by
the states to restrict a shareholder's freedom to accept or reject a tender
offer. The Maryland Act recognizes this and does not attempt to restrict
this freedom. Indeed, the new Maryland statute makes no effort to reg-
ulate tender offers at all.1
22
Those who argue that takeovers are desirable presume that stock-
holders deciding whether or not to tender are making a rational eco-
nomic judgment.2 3 It is widely recognized, however, that there are at
least two features of takeovers, as they generally take place today, that
threaten that essential assumption. The first flaw, which is often inher-
ent in the tender offer which is the first step in the takeover, is that a
tender offer does not produce rational economic judgments if it gives
stockholders too little time or too little information. 124 Most authorities
recognize that, in this regard, more is not necessarily better. Beyond a
certain point, additional time serves little purpose except to afford in-
cumbent management further opportunity to fend off the tender offer
through the use of tactics that are not in the corporation's or the share-
holders' best interests. 125 Similarly, beyond a certain point, additional
information simply overwhelms the shareholders.
12 6
The question, obviously, is how much is enough? Many of the
120. See generally sources cited supra note 119.
121. See, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1980), afd on other
grounds sub noma. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279-80 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on ground of inproper venue sub nom. Leroy
v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
122. The lawsuits challenging the validity of the state takeover statutes enacted between
1968 and 1981 were typically filed by tender offerors at the same time that they announced
their tender offers. One major consequence of Maryland's shift from tender offer regulation
would appear to be that a lawsuit challenging the validity of the Act could not be filed until a
tender offer had been completed and a concrete plan for a merger or similar transaction had
been recommended by the target's board of directors. Prior to the completion of the tender
offer, the tender offeror apparently would be without standing to challenge the Act because it
comes into play only when a ten percent shareholder seeks to deal with the corporation. Prior
to the recommendation of a concrete plan for a merger or similar transaction, the application
of the Act apparently would be too speculative to give rise to a justiciable case or controversy.
123. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 16, at 1165-68.
124. Cf. Note, supra note 76, at 523-24 (delay and disclosure benefit the investor).
125. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976) (legislative history of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976).
126. See, e.g., E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 219-20 (1977).
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courts that struck down state takeover statutes on preemption grounds
concluded that Congress meant the time and information provisions of
the Williams Act to be the final judgment on what the balance should
be, rather than just a set of minimum standards.1 2 7 Those federal court
decisions cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of further attempts
by the states to strike a different time and information balance, even if
states manage to do so without running afoul of a rule which the SEC
promulgated in 1980 to make it extremely difficult for one to comply
simultaneously with both the Williams Act and any other scheme of
tender offer regulation. 128 The Maryland Act recognizes this and does
not attempt to alter the time and information balance struck by the
Williams Act.
The second feature of takeovers that threatens the assumption that
shareholders deciding whether or not to tender are making a rational
economic judgment is the coercion implicit in many tender offers. Al-
though this second flaw affects a shareholder's decision whether to
tender, it does not result from the nature of the tender offer itself.
Rather, it results from the nature of the forced transaction that gener-
ally follows the tender offer.129 Until recently, a stockholder considering
a tender offer just worried that such a transaction might be the next
step. 30 In the era of front-loaded or two-tiered tender offers, however, a
stockholder considering a tender offer knows what is coming next, be-
cause he has already been informed of the details of the coming "cram-
down."'
1 3 1
An elementary principle of both political and economic theory is
that an "election," whether it be an election in the strict political sense
or the process by which stockholders "vote" to accept or reject a tender
offer, is not an accurate barometer of the group's sentiments if one but
only one of the competing candidates will be in a position, if he wins, to
reward those who voted for him and to punish those who voted against
him. 13 2 When that occurs, the vote is skewed toward the candidate who
possesses the advantage. 33 Prior to the passage of the Act, tender offer-
127. See, e.g., MITE Corp v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 495-98 (7th Cir. 1980) (time),affdon other
grounds sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280-81 (5th Cir. 1978) (information), rev'd on grounds of improper venue
sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 179 (1979).
128. See supra note 86.
129. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 18, at 337; Carney, supra note 17, at 347-53;
Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 307-09.
130. See Carney, supra note 17, at 350.
131. See id
132. See id. at 351-53 & nn.46-50.
133. See id.
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ors bidding for Maryland corporations possessed that advantage. The
appraisal rights, fiduciary duties, and other mechanisms of traditional
state corporation law had not guaranteed stockholders who failed to
tender that, if they lost the "election," they would receive as much in the
forced transaction as the tendering stockholders received when they sold
their stock.13 4 This is precisely what the Act does guarantee.
Quite simply, the Act concerns the rights of minority stockholders
in a transaction between the corporation and the majority stockholder.
Thus, the Act directly concerns the corporation's "internal affairs" as
that term was defined in the portion of Justice White's opinion that was
joined by a majority of the MITE Court. The new Maryland statute
directly concerns "matters peculiar to the relationships among or be-
tween the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders.""3 5
C Applicaion ofJustice White's Analysis
The first half of the analysis employed by Justice White was
designed to determine whether the statute there at issue was preempted
by the Williams Act.136 In stark contrast with the statute at issue in
MITE and all of the other state takeover statutes enacted between 1968
and 1981, the Act does not even attempt to regulate the field occupied
by the Williams Act. Because the two statutes regulate entirely different
transactions, there is no difficulty in complying with the requirements of
both the Williams Act and the Maryland Act. Similarly, because the
Maryland Act does not address the time and information aspects of a
tender offer, the new statute clearly does not frustrate the time and in-
formation objectives of the Williams Act. Furthermore, the Act does not
jeopardize the Williams Act's purported attempt to insure that stock-
holders are left free to accept or reject a tender offer.'3 7 To the extent
that the Maryland Act can be said to affect this aspect of the tender
offer at all, the new statute is entirely consistent with Congress' pur-
ported objective, because it guarantees that a stockholder will be able to
make a rational judgment, free from the coercive influences that are
now often present.
The last half of the analysis employed by Justice White was
designed to determine whether the Illinois statute unduly interfered
with interstate commerce. 38 Because the new Maryland statute regu-
134. See supra note 20.
135. 457 U.S. at 645.
136. See id. at 630-32.
137. See supra note 83; supra text accompanying notes 92-93 & 119-21.
138. See 457 U.S. at 640.
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lates the forced transaction stage of a takeover rather than the tender
offer stage, its effect on the tender offer, and thus on interstate com-
merce, is patently indirect. Therefore, even if the direct-indirect distinc-
tion continues to have significance in commerce clause jurisprudence, 3 9
the Act is safe from invalidation on that score.
That brings us, finally, to the one aspect of Justice White's analysis
that commanded a majority vote in MITE-the commerce clause bal-
ancing test.' 4 The Court's description of the burdens imposed upon
interstate commerce by the Illinois Act indicates that the Court has en-
dorsed the view that takeovers generally are economically desirable.' 4 '
Unlike the Illinois Act, however, which was aimed at all tender offers,
the Maryland Act is aimed only at those in which the tender offeror
truly intends to provide less compensation to the stockholders who do
not tender than to the stockholders who do. Even assuming that take-
overs in general are economically desirable, there are few who would
argue in favor of the practice of differential compensation.' 4 2 Thus,
even if one gives full rein to the economic philosophy that apparently
captured majority endorsement in MITE, the burden imposed on inter-
state commerce by the Maryland Act is insignificant.
As for the other side of the equation, the Maryland Act, unlike the
statute at issue in MITE, qualifies as regulation of the "internal affairs"
of corporations incorporated in the regulating state. Indeed, the Mary-
land Act is a paradigmatic example of such regulation. The interest
served by the Act-protection of minority shareholders-is legitimate
and substantial.' 4 3 The interest outweighs the insignificant burden
which the Act imposes on interstate commerce.
Given that the Act is a clear example of "internal affairs" regula-
tion, subjecting it to the balancing test gives undue credit to those who
might challenge the statute's validity. The task of regulating a corpora-
tion's "internal affairs" has traditionally been left to the state of incorpo-
ration, and that allocation of authority is so clearly established that it
would not be questioned in other contexts. 4 Indeed, the law governing
the "internal affairs" of corporations has been positively protected from
139. See supra notes 95-96 & 100 and accompanying text.
140. See 457 U.S. at 643-46.
141. See supra text accompanying note 108.
142. But see Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 23, at 698.
143. See Sargent, supra note 69, at 724-27.
144. See id.
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"federalization." '14 5 All in all, the constitutionality of the Act should be
beyond doubt.
145. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (federal courts should refer to state law
to determine whether independent directors have power to terminate derivative suits brought
under the federal securities laws); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 461 (1977) (absent
allegations that the defendants were guilty of misrepresentations or omissions of material fact,
the plaintiff had no cause of action under the federal securities laws; the plaintiffs sole rem-
edy for an "unfair" transaction was under state corporate law); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975) (in deference to state corporate law, a cause of action to be asserted by shareholders
against management will not be implied from a federal statute in the absence of an express
command from Congress).
